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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine to what extent the civilian-elected 
authorities have achieved control over the military in EI Salvador. Much of the literature 
on democratization suggests that such control is a necessary condition for the full 
consolidation of democracy within a country. This thesis begins with a historical 
overview of civil-military relations in EI Salvador, and focuses on current civil-military 
relations. 
The application of Alfred Stepan's eleven prerogatives is used to measure the 
level of civilian control over the military. The analysis suggests that three of the military 
prerogatives have been reduced substantially, that six prerogatives present a change from 
the high to moderate category, that one prerogative related to the relations with the chief 
executive remains in the moderate category, and finally, that the military prerogative on 
officer promotions remains in the high category. Based on this analysis, this thesis 
concludes that since 1992, elected civilian authorities have achieved considerable control 
over the military, and that thus civil-military relations in EI Salvador are on the right 
track to help the country towards consolidating a democracy. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to determine to what extent the civilian-elected 
authorities have achieved control over the military in EI Salvador. Much of the literature 
on democratization suggests that such control is a necessary condition for the full 
consolidation of democracy within a country. This thesis begins with the historical 
overview of civil-military relations in EI Salvador, and focuses on current civil-military 
relations. 
Since its independence in 1821, EI Salvador was basically a republic controlled 
by an oligarchy, backed by the armed forces. The main source of revenue was the export 
of agricultural products such as coffee, sugar cane, and cotton. The only beneficiaries of 
this situation were a small group of wealthy landowners, who also monopolized every 
aspect of Salvadoran life. 
After the 1932 revolution, the oligarchy made an alliance, or pact, with the armed 
forces, in which the military gained control over the government, and in exchange, the 
military agreed not to impede the enlargement of the oligarchy's capital. The origins of 
the 1932 revolutions are linked to the Great Depression in the United States as the 
Salvadoran economy also suffered a severe decline. That decline resulted in the oligarchy 
experiencing difficulties in keeping the country under control. Peasants had no land to 
work because of the expropriation of the community lands in the 1880's, and as daily 
salaries dropped from $ 0.50 to a $0.20, the economic situation became even worse. 
Social unrest ensued, and as a consequence, the first communist revolution in Latin 
America took place in EI Salvador. The mass of peasants revolted against the 
xi . 
government. The revolution, however, was violently suppressed by the armed forces in 
what is remembered now as "La Matanza del 32." When the revolution was brought 
under control, the oligarchy and the military formed a pact, preventing any change in the 
social conditions of the peasants. 
This pact between the oligarchy and the military was in place until 1979. In that 
year, a group of young military officers broke the pact with the oligarchy by carrying out 
a coup d'etat and tried to bring changes to the social an~ political life ofEI Salvador. But 
it was too late for social and political changes, and a civil war started. 
In 1992, after thirteen years of war, a peace agreement was signed in Mexico 
between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN). This agreement was a watershed event in achieving control over the military 
by the elected civilian government in EI Salvador, placing the country on the road to a 
consolidated democracy. 
Since 1992, the elected civilian authorities have increased their control of the 
military. When applied, Alfred Stepan's prerogatives in order to measure the level of 
civilian control achieved, nine out of the eleven prerogatives have been reduced since the 
peace agreements. Out of the nine prerogatives that displayed improvement, three of 
them moved from high category to low, taking a big step toward civilian control over the 
military. They are the constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the 
political system, the active-duty military participation in the cabinet and, the key public 
or private enterprises that are now controlled by civilians. Six prerogatives showed a 
modest change from the high to the moderate category. They are the coordination of the 
defense sector, the role of legislature, the role of senior career servants or civilian 
xii 
political appointees, the role of the intelligence apparatus, and, the role of the police, the 
role in the legal system. One prerogative remains in the moderate category, the 
relationship between the military and the chief executive. This is mostly due to the 
passive compliance on the part of the president in order to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the military and trying to keep the status quo with the military. Finally, one 
prerogative stayed in the high category. This prerogative is related to military 
promotions. Despite modifications in military law, the military retains a high prerogative 
in selecting which senior colonels are promoted to the rank of general, and when they are· 
selected. 
In conclusion, civil-military relations have improved in EI Salvador, paving the 
road to consolidating democracy in this small Central American country. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its independence in 1821, EI Salvador has basically been a republic 
controlled by an oligarchy, backed by the armed forces.! The main source of revenue was 
the export of agricultural products such as coffee, sugar cane and cotton. The only 
beneficiaries of this situation were a small group of wealthy landowners, who also 
monopolized every aspect of Salvadoran life. 
After the 1932 revolution, the oligarchy made an alliance, or, pact with the armed 
forces, in which the military obtained control over the government and, in exchange, the 
military agreed not to impede the enlargement of the oligarchy's capital. The origins of 
the 1932 revolution are linked to the Great Depression in the United States as the 
Salvadoran economy also suffered a severe economic decline. That decline resulted in 
the oligarchy experiencing difficulties in keeping the country under control. Peasants had 
no land to work because of expropriation of the community lands in the 1880's/ and as 
daily salaries dropped from $0.50 to a $0.20, the economic situation became even worse. 
Social unrest ensued, and as a consequence, the first communist revolution in Latin 
America took place in EI Salvador. The mass of peasants revolted against the 
government. The revolution, however, was violently suppressed by the armed forces in 
I This situation of a pact between the oligarchy and the Salvadoran armed forces makes this case study very 
interesting. This case will demonstrate that the society was not militarized as is commonly believed, but 
rather controlled by a sector of the society which governed the entire country, socially, politically, 
economically militarily. 
2 The communal property, or ejidos, was expropriated by the govemment and transformed into coffee 
plantations in 1860. 
--- --------~--~--------------------------------
what is remembered now as "La Matanza deI32.,,3 When the revolution was brought 
under control, the oligarchy and the military formed a pact and prevented any change in 
the social conditions ofthe peasants. 
This pact between the oligarchy and the military was in place until 1979. In that 
year, a 'group of young military officers broke the pact with the oligarchy by carrying out 
a coup d'etat and trying to bring changes to the social and political life of EI Salvador. 
However, it was too late for social and political changes, and a civil war started. After 
thirteen years of war, a peace agreement was signed between the Salvadoran Government 
and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the Chapultepec castle, 
Mexico. This Agreement was a watershed event in achieving control over the military by 
the elected civilian government in EI Salvador and placed the country on the road to a 
consolidated democracy. 
A. PROJECT SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis is significant for several reasons. First, it analyzes development of 
civil-military relations in EI Salvador. Second, it assesses the uneasy willingness of the 
Salvadoran armed forces to subordinate themselves to the civilian authorities. Third, and 
most importantly, it examines the extent to which EI Salvador after 1992, can be a role 
model for the Central American region as well as for other countries in a similar process 
of democratization. 
This thesis examines civil-military relations in EI Salvador to determine if there 
has been any improvement in those relations since 1992, when the government and the 
3 La Matanza del 32 is known in English as The Massacre. 
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FMLN signed the peace agreement. An additional objective will be to evaluate the effect 
of civil-military relations on the democratic consolidation ofthe country. 
The study of civil-military relations posits many possibilities among them. First, 
the armed forces can directly control society, using force or the threat of force to 
accomplish their goals. Second, the armed forces can be under the control of a legitimate 
and elected government. Finally, and in the case least known by scholars, the armed 
forces are under the control of a specific non-governmental sector of the society. In this 
last case, the controlling sector imposes its ideas on the rest of the country's population as 
well as on the armed forces. This is the focus of this study: EI Salvador's civil-military 
relations. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND THEORY TO BE EMPLOYED 
This is a single case study. The outcome, or dependent variable, is the level of 
democracy achieved by EI Salvador. The causal, or independent variable, is civil-
military relations. This study employs the "selected prerogatives of the military as an 
institution in a democratic regime," posited by Alfred Stepan in Rethinking Military 
Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Those prerogatives are: 
• Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the political 
system; 
• Military relationship to the chief executive; 
• Coordination of defense factor; 
• Active-duty military participation in the Cabinet; 
• Role of Legislature; 
• Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees; 
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• Role in intelligence; 
• Role in police; 
• Role in military promotions; 
• Role in state enterprises; 
• Role in the legal system; 
The findings are divided into three categories of prerogatives, following Stepan's 
classification: low, moderate and high. A low prerogative is de jure and de facto effective 
control, exercised by civilians over the military. "In cases where the military has de jure 
been denied a prerogative, but the new democratic government, due to active or passive 
noncompliance by the military, does not effectively exercise this prerogative, military 
prerogatives would be classified as low.'''' A high prerogative is defined as the military 
retaining and exercising a high degree of autonomy and control over the government. 
This analysis of the findings, using the categories mentioned above, covers the 
most difficult times for Salvadoran society in recent history: twelve years of civil war 
during which approximately 70,000 lives were lost. The study addresses whether, and to 
what extent, the country's civil-military relations have bolstered democratic stability. 
It is difficult to define democracy in a way that pleases everyone. However, 
understanding that democracy involves a process, Alfred Stepan offers the following: 
Democratization requires the open contestation for the right to win control 
of the government, and in turn requires free elections. Democratization 
entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political 
concept.s 
4 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 97. 
s Ibid., 7. 
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This thesis employs Stepan's definition. As it is implied in this definition, 
democracy means something more than elections; it is also about the oversight and control 
of state power. A good civil-military relation is considered established when the 
subordination and control of the military institutions by the freely elected representatives 
of the people in a democratic society is achieved. Therefore, this is an important aspect to 
be considered for any country in transition to a consolidated democracy. 
Democracy is also a dynamic process, and the party system plays a very important 
role here. The institutionalization of a party system is therefore a key aspect of this 
process because in EI Salvador the hegemonic party system did not allow for formal or de 
facto competition for power, and other parties existed but as second-class licensed parties. 
Also, the inchoate party system, which is a multi-party system with weak organization, 
could, as a hegemonic party system, lead the country in the wrong direction. However, 
.the scope of this thesis is confined to civil-military relations because achieving civilian 
control over the armed forces makes it clear that military institutions are only the means 
to achieving political objectives, assuming also that the armed forces are not ruling or 
acting above the law. 
A brief summary of the thesis follows. Chapter I includes the introduction, the 
project significance, which comprises three basic aspects: first, the development of civil-
military relations in EI Salvador; second, the questionable willingness of the Salvadoran 
armed forces to be subordinate themselves to the proper authorities; and third, the 
examination of to what extent the Salvadoran process after 1992 can be used as a role 
model in other countries. Chapter I concludes with the explanation of the methodology 
5 
and theory employed, which is the application of Alfred Stepan' prerogatives. Chapter II 
is a synopsis of the period between 1932 to 1989 describing the reasons that created the 
conditions for the Salvadoran civil war in the early 1930's. This chapter stresses that the 
Salvadoran government did not properly address the social problems; therefore, they 
merely remained submerged until they reemerged in the 1980's. In addition, the first 
analysis of Stepan's prerogatives is carried out to detennine the category in which the 
Salvadoran military was .located according to these prerogatives before the peace 
agreements. Chapter III is a brief summary of the peace talks between the government 
and the FMLN. Included are the four topics of the peace accords: the role of the armed 
forces, the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions, the economic and social 
matters, and the end of the FMLN military structure and legal entry of its membt'?rs into 
civil, political and institutional life. Chapter IV is an· analysis of the aftennath of the 
peace agreements until 1997, and the researcher applies Stepan's prerogatives to the 
situation after the peace agreements during the transition from civil war to peace in EI 
Salvador. Chapter V is a series of conclusions and recommendations to facilitate the 
transition ofEI Salvador into a consolidated democracy. 
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II. HISTORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 
EL SALVADOR FROM 1932-1992 
The pseudo military control of Salvadoran society emerged in 1932, when the 
President of the country, Dr. Arturo Araujo, was overthrown by a military coup d'etat. 
From that point on, military regimes have controlled the country until 1979, when another 
coup sought to reestablish democracy in El Salvador. For the almost fifty years prior to 
1979, El Salvador was virtually permanently subjected to political unrest, and military 
officers officially ruled the country. Table 1 represents this situation chronologically in 
detail. 7 
1932-1934 General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez 
1934-1935 General Andres Ignacio Menendez 
1935-1944 General Maximilano Hernandez Martinez 
1945-1945 General Osmin Aguirre y Salinas 
1945.-1948 General Salvador Castaneda Castro 
1948-1950 Revolutionary Council of Government 
1950-1956 Lt.Col Oscar Osorio 
1956-1960 Colonel Jose Maria Lemus 
1960-1961 Government Revolutionary Junta 
1961-1962 Civil-Military Directorate 
1962-1962 Dr. Rodolfo F. Cordon 
1962- 1967 Colonel Julio A. Rivera 
1967-1972 General Fidel Sanchez Hernandez 
1972-1977 Colonel Arturo Armando Molina 
1977-1979 General Carlos Humberto Romero 
Table 1. Heads of State in EI Salvador (1931-1979) 
Source: Armstrong, and Shenk, Janet. EI Salvador-Why a revolution? 
6 As stated before, the real control of the country was in the hands of the oligarchy and not from the armed 
forces. 
7 Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, "El Salvador-Why a Revolution?", NACLA Report on the Americas, 
Vol. XIV, no. 4 (July-August 1980): 46. 
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The above table shows that mainly military governments from 1932 to 1979 
controlled the country. The beginning of these military governments from 1932 to 1944 
was marked by individualistic and autocratic rule. Later, military rule developed into an 
official party and a hegemonic party system. This official party throughout the years 
changed its image, but kept the military in political control of the country. 
From 1932 to 1944, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez ruled the country, 
including the puppet government of Andres I. Mendez. Martinez's government was an 
extension of the army, because he successfully imposed the order and discipline of the 
military on the country. The civilian population was pleased by this hard-core discipline, 
supervised by patrullas cantonalei to which approximately one of every five adult males 
belonged. In 1944 however, after 13 years of dictatorship, the Salvadoran masses 
repudiated Hernandez Martinez's government and brought it to an end.9 
General Hernandez Martinez's successor, Colonel Osmin Aguirre y Salinas, 
stayed in power until a new round of elections was held. Elections were carried out in 
1945, and retired General Salvador Castaneda Castro from the official party won and 
subsequently ruled the country from 1945 to 1948. 
In 1948, General Castaneda Castro was overthrown in a coup d'etat. Because he 
wanted to continue Martinez's authoritarian political system, a number of army officers 
and civilians installed a Junta called the Revolutionary Council of Government (RCG), 
which "sought to legitimize its existence via new political rhetoric and new way of 
8 The patrullas cantonales was an army reservist organization, which was established in all cities in the 
country. They helped the army control the rural areas due to the small number of active-duty army 
personnel. The total number of active armed forces in El Salvador at that time was around 3,000. 
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ruling.,,10 The ReG issued a proclamation, which spelled out the nature of democracy 
under consideration: "for one, liberty could only flourish within an environment of order, 
free of extremist views and demagoguery."ll 
Salvadoran historian Mariano Castro Moran summed up the approach this way: 
"Thus while on the one hand the Armed Forces would become apolitical, on the other they 
will be responsible for guaranteeing that liberty and forensuring respect for the law.,,12 
In 1952, in a new round of elections, the candidate for the Unified Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRUD), which was the official party, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar 
Osorio, won the elections. He and his allies in the oligarchy established total control of 
the country. They opposed any attempt t~ change the unequal system of land tenure, 
''which enabled [them] to monopolize the profit of the export trade and use these to 
control the financial sector as well." 13 
Consequently, military rule was legitimized through the elections. The opposition 
was disorganized and posed no threat to them .. Therefore, the official party in a relatively 
honest democratic process won elections. 
Six years later in 1958, Col. Jose Maria Lemus, another candidate for the PRUD, 
replaced LTC Osorio as President. However, he made the same mistakes as his 
predecessor in his internal policies, and the domestic political situation did not improve. 
9 A national strike which is knovm as "la huelga de brazos caidos" (Folded-arms strike), because no one 
worked in any public or private office and thus forced Martinez to leave the country on 2 March 1944. 
10 Castro Moran, La Proclama del 1948. (San Salvador: EI Salvador, 1962),380-381. 
11 Ibid. , 380-381. 
12 This is an important statement, because starting here, the armed forces also assumed the internal 
security o'fthe country. 
13 Enrique A. Baylora, El Salvador in Transition, (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1992), 132. 
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Six years later in 1958, Col. Jose Maria Lemus, another candidate for the PRUD, 
replaced LTC Osorio as President. However, he made the same mistakes as his 
predecessor in his internal policies, and the domestic political situation did not improve. 
Therefore, Colonel Lemus was overthrown by a coup d'etat in 1960 and a civic-military 
junta (Directorio Civico Militar) replaced him. During this period, the armed forces 
controlled major positions in the government and also played a political role in helping 
the official party (PRUD) carry out the political campaign to consolidate their position in 
the political arena. 
Prior to 1960, the political parties did not represent the interests of particular 
groups in society or provide alternative programs for governing the country. From the 
early 1960's to early 1970's, the party system became more pluralistic as the period of 
industrialization associated with the "Alliance for Progress,,14 and the Central American 
Common Market increased the influence of the middle and urban working classes. This 
was an example of what happened when liberalizers begin to open a system in a country: 
it becomes unstable. 
The oligarchy and the military accepted a slight liberalizing of the political 
process. However, with increased urbanization and the expansion of the industry with the 
common market, labor organizations challenged the status quo. The challenge to the 
ruling oligarchy-military alliance was carried out through the 1972 elections. This was a 
14 This program helped developing countries under U.S. President John F. Kennedy's administration. For 
more information about Alliance for Progress see, Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance that 
Lost its Way. A Critical Report on the Alliancefor Progress. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970). 
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Nationalist Union (UDN), the Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS) and the National 
Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Its presidential candidate was Jose Napoleon Duarte, 
who was the mayor of San Salvador at that time. The government party, the National 
Conciliation Party (pCN)15 selected as its candidate Colonel Arturo Armando Molina. 
To the government's surprise, Duarte, representing the UNO party, won the 
election, but the government did not accept this defeat, and the official party, the peN, 
declared itself the winner of the election and denied UNO's victory through fraud. 16 Many 
military officers refused to associate themselves with this electoral fraud and attempted a 
coup. Two military units, the 1 st Infantry Brigade and the Artillery Brigade rebelled 
against the government. Duarte led the coup and, using radio stations, called on the 
civilian population to rebel. However, the lack of coordination and trust between civilian 
and military forces resulted in the failure of the coup. 
Duarte and a number of officers were captured by the Police,17 and later exiled to 
different South American countries. Thus the movement ended. Subsequently, the 
Salvadoran armed forces institutionalized themselves within the constitutional framework 
and used it to manipulate the democratic process. Therefore, according to Alain Rouquie, 
the military could be at the same time ''Elected, constitutional and undemocratic. ,,18 
14 This program helped developing countries under U.S. President John F. Kennedy's administration. For 
more information about Alliance for Progress see, Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance that 
Lost its Way. A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970). 
15 In 1962 the National Conciliation Party (pCN) was organized as a direct offspring of the Unified 
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRUD) and became the new official Party. 
16 For more information about the 1972 elections see Baloyra, EI Salvador in Transition, 43-49. 
17 The police were under the control of the armed forces through the Ministry of Defense and Public 
Security. . 
18 Alain Rouquie, Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military Dominated Politics of Central 
America, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986). 
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Salvadoran anned forces institutionalized themselves within the constitutional framework 
and used it to manipulate the democratic process. Therefore, according to Alain Rouquie, 
the military could be at the same time "Elected, constitutional and undemocratic."18 
The governments of General Fidel Sanchez (1967-1972) and Colonel Arturo 
Armando Molina (1972-1977) faced many problems besides the popular discontent 
caused by fraudulent elections. These included displacement of people from their land by 
the expansion of the international agricultural export market, as well as residual factors 
resulting from the war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969.19 
In the political field, the ruling official party (PCN) dispensed favors in order to 
guarantee the fidelity of its members. However, the main problem was that the people 
had no way to express their needs, and their discontent grew. After the fraudulent 
elections of 1972, communist organizations realized that achieving power through 
.popular elections in the manner of Chile's Salvador Allende was impossible in EI 
Salvador. The main leader of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS) was Shaffic 
Handal. He had been, in fact, the General Secretary of the PCS since 1970. Also, despite 
its long-held official line on pursuing power through nonviolent means, the PCS 
consistently followed a dual-track approach to power, using a strategy of employing both 
legal and quasi-legal activities including infiltration of unions, use of legal fronts, and 
participation by those fronts in elections.20 
18 Alain Rouquie, Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military Dominated Politics of Central 
America, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986). 
19 The war brought thousands of Salvadorans back from Honduras. A large number of these became 
refugees in their own land. 
20 The Communist party was banned at that time in El Salvador. 
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Because of this dual-track approach, the communist party split into many smaller 
organizations. Some were more violent than others. All of them developed at about the 
same time. Five different political groups organized to initiate insurgency in the political 
and military fields, with each political organization having a military organization 
supporting their ideas. These included the following: 
Political Organizations 
• The Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS). 
• Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). 
• People's Revolutionary Army (ERP or PRS). 
• Armed Forces of National Resistance (F ARN or RN). 
• Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC). 21 
At the same time, military insurgency organizations were created in order to 
pursue the dual track in the political and the military arenas. These military organizations 
include: 
Military Insurgency Organizations 
• Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) from the PCS. 
• Popular Army of Liberation (ELP) and Popular Liberation Armed Forces 
(F APL) from the FPL. 
• Salvadoran Revolution Party or People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) from 
ERP. 
• Armed Forces of National Resistance or National Resistance (RN) from the 
FARN-RN. 
• Armed Commando of Liberation (CAL) from the PRTC. 
21 Giralt-Barraza, Salvador, A. "El Salvador: History of an Insurgency. " Low Intensity Conflict &Law 
Enforcement, Vol. 3, Autumn 1994, Number 2, p. 271, Frank Cass-London. 
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The above list will help the reader follow the communist divisions experienced in 
the early 1970's and the organizations that were created. The failure to bring about 
changes in the political system through elections and other legal means convinced many 
would-be democrats that reforms could only be achieved by non-democratic methods; 
thus the guerrilla organizations began to emerge. 
The military's control of the rural areas, so carefully managed since the 
insurrection of 1932, began to break down. The reasons for these changes were varied. 
First, the Catholic Church played an important role by making peasants aware of their 
impoverished life and unjust conditions.22 The most important and charismatic leader of 
the Catholic Church was Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero.23 Second, the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine had influenced the successful insurgencies in Cuba and Nicaragua. 
Third, the repressive regime supported the oligarchy to maintain the status quo. 
After the failure of the Central American Common Market during the late 
1960's,24 people who lived and worked in the rural areas were subjected to increased 
hardship as land and opportunities for work became scarce. Therefore, the peasants and 
workers were willing to take any action necessary to overcome this critical situation. 
Under the presidency of Colonel Molina, the military tried to detach itself from 
politics. This action was intended to "regain control and protect its own from leftist 
22 By 1960, 1.9% of the Salvadoran population owned 57.5% of the land. Comite Interamericano de 
Desarrollo Agricola (CIDA) of the Organization of American States, 1960. 
23 Archbishop Romero was killed during a mass in 1980 and his death remains unsolved, despite heavy 
accusations against a retired major named Robert d' Abuisson. 
24 After the war between El Salvador and Honduras in July 1969, the Central American Common Market 
was dissolved. 
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subversion and rightist attempts to control the government.,,25 However, the armed forces 
had problems doing so, and Colonel Molina's slogan of "Definition, Decision and 
Firmness" was meaningless in a country that was tom apart socially and politically. 
The elections for congressional seats and mayorships in 1974, 1976, and 1977 
were again fraudulent. Stuffed ballot boxes were transported in military vehicles and 
there was widespread intimidation of voters by the National Democratic Organization26 
(ORDEN), a paramilitary association. 
Colonel Molina's government carried out a tentative agrarian refonn program in 
1975, but just one year later the government delayed and later stopped the program, in spite 
of the commitment of many Salvadorans. This action was perceived by the oligarchy as a 
violation of the 1948 tacit pact with the military, in which the military institution gave 
itself the right to rule the country and agreed not to interfere with the economic plan of 
the oligarchy. The intent to carry out the agrarian refonn directly jeopardized the source 
from which the oligarchy was expanding their capital base. As a result, the military was, 
repudiated by the civilians, and seen as traitors by the oligarchy. 
The problems mentioned above increased the pressure on the military 
government. These problems added to those of the "stolen" elections, the bad 
distribution of the land and wealth,z' and repression and violence against the civilian 
2S Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, 253 
26 Col. Julio A. Rivera created ORDEN in 1964, and its mission was to curb the influence of communist 
ideology. 
27 The military was in charge of the government and therefore responsible for correcting this situation. 
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population, among others. Consequently, an armed confrontation began for which the 
military was poorly prepared. 
According to Haggerty in the book, El Salvador: A Country Study, "the Salvadoran 
defense budgets traditionally were relatively modest, and the percentage of the national 
income devoted to the armed forces generally conservative.,,28 During the 1960's and the 
1970's, the United States was primarily responsible for foreign training assistance. The 
total aid program from 1957 to 1979 was $17 million. During this period, the Military 
Assistance Program (MAP) of $7.4 million was far less than that received by any other 
Central American country, except Costa Rica.29 Also, statistical data from the government 
budget indicate that, "military spending as percentage of the total budget declined in the 
same period."30 Not even in the war against Honduras in 1969 did the country change the 
military budget significantly. The figures for. training and recruitment of new regular army 
soldiers were lower than in the 1950's: 2,247 new troops from July 1976 to June 1977, 
according to records of Salvadoran Ministry of Defense and Public Security. 
Confirming this pitiful military situation is the May 1981 report of the Military 
Strategy Assistance Team in EI Salvador, commonly known as the Woerner Report 
concluded, that the EI Salvador armed forces required dramatic changes within their 
28 Haggerty, Richard A EI Salvador: A Country Study. Washington, DC., Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, p. 209. 
29 Ibid. p.. 223. 
30 Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos. San Salvador 1970-1980. Tablas de Direccion General de 
Estadistica y Censos. 
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structure and more effective use of counter-insurgency operations if they wanted the 
country to survive.31 
. The Church, applying the Liberation Theology, emerged as an active player and 
helped the peasants organize in order to improve their conditions, which resulted in 
widespread unrest in the rural areas. In the urban areas, the National Association of 
Private Enterprise (ANEP)32 and the Agrarian Front of the Eastern Region (F ARO)33 
asked the military, not the .government, to deal with the growing pressure from popular 
sectors. This pressure included labor demands, as well as calling for a halt to the 
repression. 
According to Guido Vejar the military answer was: 
The law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order passed on 
November 241977 by President, General Romero. This law tried to fulfill 
a series of bids by the private sector for a . firmer hand against the 
opposition.34 
However, the law was relatively ineffective in dealing with the labor turmoil. 
From November 1977 to February 1979, matters worsened and General Romero dropped 
all pretenses of an agrarian reform, which increased the violence and discontent of the 
population. The military renewed their alliance with their old friend, the oligarchy, in 
31 Manwaring, G. Max and Prisk, Court. El Salvador at War: An Oral History. Washington D.C. National 
Defense University Press, 1988, p. 49. 
32 The oligarchy and bourgeoisie led the National Association of Enterprise. They pushed for a social 
market economy. It was politically heterogeneous, but mainly right-centered. 
33 Traditional oligarchic landowners and cattlemen led the Agrarian Front of the Eastern Region. They 
looked for authoritarian political control as opposed to democratic capitalism. 
34 Vejas Rafael Guidos, La Crisis Politica en El Salvador, 1976-1979. ECA 34., 369/370. 
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order to face the emerging insurgency. In order to control the insurgency, the armed 
forces employed the only method they knew: repressing social movements.35 
The church, in response to this increase of violence, firmly demanded that the 
government stop the killings and disappearances. This gave the government its final 
blow, and removed any claim of legitimacy. Table 2 shows the guerrilla groups in EI 
Salvador. In direct correlation, the more the insurgents became organized, the more the 
violence increased. Popular organizations, because of this polarization, were favored 
with an increased number of members. Therefore, their strength at that time was the vast 
number of people they represented. Because of this threat to the government, these 
popular organizations were considered satellites of the guerrilla movement. 36 
As seen in Table 3, the number of killings and kidnappings increased on both 
sides. On the one hand, the government under General Romero increased the number of 
political assassinations and disappearances dramatically. On the other hand, in the same 
period, the guerrilla organizations doubled the number of killings of security personnel 
and paramilitary personnel, and kidnappings of prominent personalities in the economic, 
political, and social arenas. 
3S Analyzing the country's situation from 1932-1970, and using Skocpol's template of social revolution, I 
believe it did apply in EI Salvador. Skocpol argues "Social revolutions result from state political crisis, 
often exacerbated by international factors, that may be taken advantage of by revolutionary vanguards." 
However, a different approach can be made when we analyze that in EI Salvador the authoritarian regime, 
which despite being isolated from the majority of the population, unlike Cuba and Nicaragua, the military-
oligarchy alliance maintained its cohesion, and the revolutionary opposition was not able to consolidate a 
broader movement. . 
36 The PCS and the PRTC at this time were not ready to enter into a military confrontation, but they would 
join later. 
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FPL FARN ERP 
Origins Splinters ofPCS 1970 Division ofERP 1975 Proponent of the foco 
theory 
Leadership Workers, peasants, Workers, students, Workers, students, 
teachers teachers teachers 
Tactic Killing mainly Kidnappings of Military actions 
oligarchy. prominent politicians 
and businessmen 
Strategy Guerra Popular Popular Insurrection Guerrilla Warfare 
Propaganda 
Ideology Marxist-Leninist Marxist-Leninist Marxist-Leninist 
Alliances PCS National Resistance, PRS, LP-28 
FAPU 
Program Revolutionary Socialist Society Popular Democratic 
Government Government 
Comparative Features Largest, most orthodox Most visible Best trained and 
efficient as a force 
Table 2. GuerrIlla Groups ID EI Salvado~7 
Source: Italo Lopez Vallecillo, Fuerzas Sociales y el Cambio en el Salvador. 
Categories Gen. Molina (1972-77) Gen. Romero (1977-79) 
By" the Government 
Political Assassination 37 461 
Prosecuted for political offenses 113 88 
Disappeared 69 131 
Other terrorist acts 9 4 
Initiated by the guerrillas 
Attacks 31 60 
Killing security personnel 24 24 
Killing paramilitary personnel 8 16 
Wounded in guerrilla Attacks 11 14 
Kidnappings 8 16 
Table 3. Political Violence in EI Salvador38 
37 Italo Vallecillo Lopez, , Fuerzas Sociales y el Cambio Social en El Salvador. CA 34, Oct-Nov, 1979, 
574-75. 
38 Italo Vallecillo Lopez, Rasgos Sociales y Tendencias Politicas en EI Salvador, ECA 34, Jul-Ago, 1979, 
871. 
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Regarding this increase of violence, Baloyra stated: 
The political mobilization was not the result of a communist conspiracy 
nor was it a direct result of the difficult social circumstances of the popular 
classes. It is true that 90% of the work force of 1. 75 million Salvadorans 
were paid when employed salaries below minimal wage and that they 
faced harsh economic conditions. 39 
At this moment in the Salvadoran history, therefore, the communist movement was not 
consolidated. With the political and social situation almost out of control, a bloodless 
coup took place on October 15, 1979. The new junta tried to implement political and 
social changes in the country, but made a fatal mistake in excluding the popular 
organizations. This hindered the process of democratization, which of course has been 
attempted earlier. 
In 1979, no coalition without the participation of the popular organizations would 
be capable of regaining political balance. Also, the oligarchy's economic and political 
power and the military's role as an institution had to be redefined. However, a 
redefinition of the political role of the Salvadoran armed forces in 1979 was impossible 
due to the civil war, which had already started, and the military perceived themselves as 
the only organization that could save the country. 
The armed forces', therefore, were again playing in the political arena. A new 
generation of officers, believing that they were established to serve the entire civilian 
popUlation and not just a small part of it, decided to take control of the government. A 
bloodless institutional coup d'etat was carried out to remove General Romero from 
office. The proclamation issued on 15 October 1979 projected a new line of military 
39 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transitiun • 
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thinking which invoked human rights, political pluralism, and electoral reform. Also, the 
paramilitary organization ORDEN was to be abolished. 
The military relied on civilian partners to help organize the new junta to take 
control of the government, but this effort did not last long. The first junta was composed 
of two military men, Col. Abdul Gutierrez and LTC. Adolfo Majano, and three civilians. 
Two of the civilians, Ramon Mayorga Quiroz and Guillermo Manuel Ungo, represented 
the political parties of the opposition, including the Communist Party and one 
independent civilian, Mario Andino, represented the emerging Private Enterprise. This 
junta did not last long either. "The representatives of the Communist party realizing that 
they were the minority and would not be able to contr01 the junta, quit in December 
1979."40 
In an effort to ease the chaotic situation in the country and to solve the politic:H 
impasse, the Christian Democratic Party 41 (PDC) entered into an alliance with the armed 
forces and organized another civil-military. junta in January 1980. The reformist 
credentials of this party, and its history of opposition to military dictatorship lent it 
internal and external credibility and support to EI Salvador process of change. 
The Armed Forces agreed to the PDC demands in order to participate in the new 
junta and to carry out the reforms promised. These reforms included: agrarian reform 
(which had been promised by Colonel Molina's government) the exclusion from 
40 Salvador A. Giralt-Barraza, "EI Salvador: History of an Insurgency". Low Intensity Conflict & Law 
Enforcement, Vol. 3, Autumn 1994, no 2, Frank-Cass, London, 278. 
41 The ppC was the same political party that won the election in 1972 and its leader was Jose Napoleon 
Duarte. He became the first civilian president of El Salvador through an open electoral process supervised 
by the International Community in 1984. 
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participation by the private sector in the Cabinet, and the support of amendments to the 
constitution. After the junta was organized with the participation of the Christian 
Democrats, the political situation became more stable, allowing economic and military 
aid to arrive, and helping the country regain the offensive in the political arena. 
In 1982, a new round of elections was carried out to select the members of 
congress who were going to be the Constituent Assembly. This was the first free election 
in this new democratic era in EI Salvador, and it was supervised by the international 
community and certified as a clear and transparent one. These newly elected congress 
members .passed a series of amendments to the Salvadoran constitution and transferred 
power to a provisional government led by Alvaro Magana, who became an interim 
president from 1982-1984, until presidential elections were held. 
The military returned some key public institutions to civilian control such the 
Water Works (ANDA) and the State Industrial Development Corporation (INSAFI). In 
addition, civilians occupied the bulk of Cabinet positions, including the Ministry of 
Interior. However, the military retained prerogatives, which included maintaining control 
over security and intelligence agencies. The military court system maintained 
jurisdiction over large areas of civil society and the domain where military personnel 
could be tried in civil court remained narrow. Executive control over promotions was 
slight, and the military played the leading role in conducting the war, also with little 
legislative oversight. Besides, the military occupied many Cabinet positions and was still 
in charge of key public enterprises. 
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Table 4 shows the application of Alfred Stepan's prerogatives right after the 1982 
elections, which gave a new political direction to EI Salvador. 
All of the eleven prerogatives outlined in Table 4 were kept under the 1983 
Constitution. This new Constitution, in line with the previous one, accorded the armed 
forces the primary responsibility for ensuring national defense and intemallaw and order, 
guaranteeing compliance with the Constitution and other laws, and defending the 
democratic system of government. This was just the starting point on a long road to 
/-~ 
democracy. In the military arena, the country spiraled into violence from 1981 to 1989. 
The Salvadoran civil war was a continuation of the Cold War, but this time the fight was 
too close to the Panama canal; a zone of special interest to the United States. Also, the 
Reagan Administration in the United States feared "the domino effect" in the region.42 
The United State's policy toward the region in the early 1970's was to keep 
. communism from winning in Central America. When the Sandinistas assumed control 
over Nicaragua in 1979, and declared themselves followers of Marxist doctrine. They 
took the United States by surprise. 
42 The Domino effect as it is applied to El Salvador was the perception that if it fell into communist hands it 
was a matter of time before the other Central American countries and Mexico would follow. 
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Prerogative Low Moderate High 
1. Constitutionally 1. Constitution allocated 
sanctioned primary responsibility 
independent role of for intemallaw and 
the military in the Order and guarantee of 
political system the democratic process 
2. Military 2. The President was the 
relationship to the Commander in Chief of the 
Chief Executive ESAF. But exercised very 
seldom its authority 
3. Coordination of 3. The Minister of 
Defense Sector Defense was an active 
duty senior military 
officer. Staff composed 
of military personnel 
4. Active duty 4. Active duty military 
military participation personnel participated in 
in the cabinet the government cabinet 
5. Role of 5. Did not provide 
Legislature oversight to the military 
budget 
6. Role of Senior 6. Active duty military 
Career Servants or personnel fill all top 
Civilian political defense sector staff roles. 
appointees Lack of civilians with 
Defense and ·Security 
education/training 
7. Role of the 7. All intelligence 
Intelligence organizations were 
controlled by military 
personnel 
8. Role of the Police 8. They were under the 
control of the Armed 
Forces 
9. Role of Military 9. The tanda system was 
Prom.otions completely independent 
of any interference 
outside of the military 
10. Role in State 10. Major state 
enterprises enterprises were 
controlled by active 
military personnel 
11. Role in the Legal 11. Military personnel 
System did not respond to the 
judicial system, but to 
military courts 
. . . . Table 4. Selected PrerogatIves of the Salvadoran MIlItary as an InstItutIon In a 
Democratic Regime Previous to the Peace Agreement in 1992 
Source: Based on Alfred Stepan. Rethinking of Military Politics. Brazil and the 
Southern Cone. 
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When the Sandinistas began to support the FMLN in the 1980's, this move was 
indeed something that everyone expected. The Sandinistas backed the insurgency in 
many ways, such as providing them with training facilities, rest and recuperation areas 
inside Nicaragua, logistic warehouses, and weapons and ammunition. Additionally, some 
expert'personnel also helped them to train and organize their forces. These actions were 
taken internationally as promoting regional instability, but this bold move helped the 
Sandinistas gain time to consolidate their revolution in Nicaragua. 
Going back to EI Salvador, and with the civil war as a background, the process of 
bringing the Salvadoran armed forces under civilian control was difficult, if not 
impossible, for two main reasons. First, the civilians were afraid to take leadership and 
full control ofthe armed forces, because the civilians would immediately become military 
targets of the guerrillas. Second, the military institution was not going to' give up its 
prerogatives so easily. Therefore, until the end of the civil war, civilian control over the 
military was not achieved. 
In order to explain why the signing of the peace agreement was a watershed for 
attaining civilian control over the military, it is necessary to know why and how the war 
ended. On June 1, 1989, Alfredo Cristiani received the presidential sash from Jose 
Napoleon Duarte. In his inaugural speech he pledged a government "based on the 
principles of liberty, honesty, legality and security.,,43 He promised to get the economy 
moving and unveiled a five-point plan for immediate talks with the FMLN. The rebels 
accepted the proposition and they issued a proposal to "initiate as soon as possible a 
43 Gruson Linsey,"The New Latin Leaders Urge Peace Talks ", New York Times, 15 September 1989, 7. 
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definite process of negotiation to put an end to the war and place all their forces at the 
service of constructing a true economy,,44 
Why did both contenders accept the Cristiani initiative? On one hand, the new 
Cristiani government and its more moderate business friends recognized the impossibility 
of economic recovery without the resolution of the war. The President also knew that in 
the spring of 1991 there would be a Legislative Assembly and mayoral elections. The 
majority of voters that ARENA enjoyed would vanish quickly if economic conditions did 
not improve and ifthere were no foreseeable end to the war. 
On the other hand, the FMLN knew the world was changing and a guerrilla 
victory would isolate the FMLN. The FMLN knew that the Sandinistas had lost the 
elections in Nicaragua in 1990, and the promises of many European and Latin American 
nations to help in the reconstruction of the country after an agreement were appealing. 
Another important factor that the Salvadoran government took into consideration 
was that the United States was no longer driven by an activist foreign policy.4s Moreover, 
with the changes in Eastern Europe in 1988-1989, the Soviet Union was not going to 
support the FMLN anymore. The Soviet Union was the loser of the Cold War.46 In the 
meantime, the civil war was still going on in EI Salvador. The armed forces, which 
44 Communique from the FMLN to the General Command, September 7, 1989. 
45 In the United States, Republican control over the Executive branch ended in January 1993. The 
Democrats were looking for an improvement in the US domestic policy, rather than focus on the external 
policies as the previous Bush administration had done. 
46 With the end of the Cold War, approximately 15 countries were looking for independence from the 
former Soviet Union. 
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included all the police organizations, were taken by surprise, when in the middle of the 
negotiations, the FMLN launched a large-scale military offensive. 47 
The Department of National Intelligence (DNI), which was the strategic 
intelligence agency, knew that the offensive was coming,48 and they tried to alert the 
Military High Command and the Executive branch, but no one listened. The president and 
his advisors assumed that the FMLN was in a weak position due to internal problems. 
This assessment underestimated their force. Besides, the Peace talks were a sign of the 
intention of the government and the guerrillas to seek peace. Negotiations were moving at 
a snail's pace, but everyone hoped that they would endure and continue. 
On November 11, 1989, the FMLN launched its final offensive. This time the 
objective was the· capital, San Salvador. They quickly took control of heavily populated 
areas in the suburbs of the capital. In order to prepare for this bold action the FMLN had 
been stockpiling weapons for almost a year in the capital, even after the negotiations for 
the peace .agreement started. According to a US offiCial, "a torrent of arms and 
ammunitions,,49 were flowing to the capital. Also, small reconnaissance units of the 
FMLN entered the capital as normal citizens to become familiar with the future area of 
operation. The plan was perfect. While the FMLN was sitting at the negotiation table, 
they were preparing the offensive, following the Mao postulate, ''fight, fight, fight, talk, 
talk, talk." 
Why did the FMLN not succeed in their attack? The government or the armed 
forces were not ready to counter this action, but the FMLN miscalculated the support of 
47 The police forces were controlled, supported, and supervised by active duty military personnel. 
48 The National Defense Intelligence was under direct control of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces. 
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Why did the FMLN not succeed in their attack? The government or the anned 
forces were not ready to counter this action, but the FMLN miscalculated the support of 
the civilian population. The FMLN was counting on massive support of the civilian 
population. The weapons and ammunition they brought to the capital were to be given to 
those who would join their ranks in the lower-class neighborhoods. The FMLN was 
trying to inspire a popular uprising in the same way that the Nicaraguans supported the 
Sandinista offensive in 1979 to overthrow the Somoza regime. The general support never 
came, but the Salvadoran population was not backing the government either. They were 
saying, it is enough, we are tired of war. 50 
After five days of siege, the civilians started evacuating the guerrilla-controlled 
areas. They knew the army was going to initiate a counterattack soon. Also, it was a 
common perception among civilians that they were being used as human shields to delay 
the army counterattack. Subsequently, they began to escape from the areas which were 
under guerrilla control. 
With the majority of the civilians out of the areas controlled by the guerrillas, the 
army began the counterattack, using limited firepower in order to avoid unnecessary 
damage to civilian property.51 The guerrilla units, without the support of the civilian 
popUlation, had to retreat to the mountains. 
so The FMLN received some support from its followers, but not as much as they thought they were going to 
have in order to create a popular uprising. 
S! There was a claim made by the guerrillas that indiscriminate aerial bombardment was carried out in San 
Salvador to repel the guerrillas. However, no proof was ever shown that massive destruction was carried 
out by military airplanes or heavy artillery. If that had been the case, the destruction caused by explosions 
and the high number of casualties in that kind of attack would be difficult to hide from the international 
press. 
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The FMLN began to retreat after realizing they were not supported by the civilian 
population. However, the anned forces at this moment did not fully realize the 
importance of the civilian rejection of the FMLN. In the middle of the FMLN offensive, 
a commando unit of the Atlacat Infantry Reaction Battalion killed six Jesuit priests, a 
maid and her daughter at the Central America Catholic University Campus. This action, 
which some speculate was an order given by the High Command, while others support 
the premise that it was an isolated decision taken by one person. Regardless, of how the 
attack was ordered, it gave the FMLN the oxygen they needed to survive. They returned 
to the negotiation table viewed not as the loser of the offensive, but as the redeemer of a 
country ruled by murderous anned forces. National and international pressure pushed the 
anned forces and the government to continue negotiations for a peace agreement under 
conditions more favorable to the FMLN. 
~he summary of this chapter with respect to the civil-military relations is that few 
changes were achieved by the civilian government to control the military. The military 
retained the majority of the prerogatives in the high category and they were playing not 
just a military role during the civil war, but a very important political role as well. 
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III. EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE CIVIL MILITARY 
RELATIONS SINCE THE PEACE AGREEMENTS 
The chapter is a brief summary of the Peace talks between the government and the 
FMLN. On September 7, 1989, a month before the FMLN launched their final offensive, 
President Cristiani swore in the members of the government's Dialogue COlll.J11.ission, 
including Doctor Oscar Alfredo Santamaria, retired Colonel Juan Antonio Martinez, 
Doctor David Escobar Salindo, Doctor Jose Abelardo Torres and Doctor Rafael Heman 
Contreras. Later, General Mauricio Emesto Vargas, vice-chief of staff of the armed 
forces, was added to the commission. 
After establishing the dialogue commission, the government sought contact with 
the FMLN to start the first round of negotiations. The first meeting took place in Mexico 
City in September 1989. The final document produced was called the "Mexico 
Agreements", which defined and established the conceptual framework and procedure of 
the negotiations . 
. The purpose of this document was " ... to finish the armed conflict by political 
means as soon as possible, in doing so impel the democratization of the country and unify 
the Salvadoran society." The agreement was signed by both parties, the government and 
the FMLN, and witnessed by Bishops Romero Tomas Astorga and Gregorio Rosa 
Chavez, both representing the Salvadoran Catholic Church.52 
52 The Catholic Church is the largest church in the country with approximately 85% of the total population. 
They were active, moreover, during the whole conflict supporting the Salvadoran population demands for 
negotiations. 
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The second meeting of the government delegation and the FMLN took place in 
San Jose, Costa Rica, October 16-18, 1989, again with representation of the Catholic 
Church, as well as the United Nations and the Organization of the American States 
(OAS). The United Nations was participating as observers for the first time. The final 
document signed by both groups and witnessed before the labor unions was called the 
San Jose Agreement, which established the following: 
The need to carry out agreements about the conditions that allow first, to 
stop the military fighting that could harm the rights of civilian people and 
lead to the end of hostilities within an agreed span of time. 53 
At the San Jose meeting, the government presented a document called 
"Proposition of the government to achieve peace, consolidate democracy, and unify 
Salvadoran society." This document was based on the Esquipulas II Agreement and 
especially on the agreement reached in Tela, Honduras,54 which declared that there were 
reasons for peace talks. These documents proposed the end of hostilities, the 
commitment of the government to protect the lives and physical integrity of FMLN 
members, as well as the incorporation of these members into the peaceful and democratic 
life of the country. The document also offered to facilitate the transformation of the 
FMLN into a political party, just the same as the other parties in EI Salvador. 
At the San Jose gathering, the time and place for a subsequent meeting was agreed 
upon. The conference was to be on November 20 and 21, 1989, in the City of Caracas. 
In spite of the offensive launched on the 11 tll of the same month, the government 
S3 Original from the San Jose Agreement. Translation by the author. This meeting was also held before the 
FMLN launched the fmal offensive in San Salvador. 
S4 In 1987, the Esquipulas II and Tela were presidential reunions of the Central America countries. 
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delegation attended the meeting in Caracas in an effort to reach the end of the conflict 
through negotiation. However, the FMLN representatives did not attend. 
The government of EI Salvador adopted the spirit of pacification of the Central 
American Presidents55 and especially the San Isidro Coronado declaration in Costa Rica. 
The government requested that the United Nations General Secretary act as a mediator to 
facilitate the negotiations and the FMLN accepted UN involvement. 
On April 4, 1990, General Secretary of the UN, Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, 
signed the Geneva Declaration, in which he agreed to put his good office in the 
framework of the mandate of the Security Board Resolution 637 signed on July 27, 1989. 
This resolution allows the UN to intervene in an internal problem of a country. Doctor 
Perez de Cuellar also stated that there was serious reason for both sides to look for a 
solution for the country by means of negotiations. The purpose of the process, according 
to the Geneva declaration, was the suspension of the armed conflict through official 
channels as soon as possible, to impel the democratization of the country, to guarantee the 
respect of human rights, and to unify the Salvadorian Society. 
The UN Secretary General named Doctor Alvarado de Soto his personal 
representative in the peace negotiations. Both sides agreed to hold their first meeting 
with him in Caracas, Venezuela, from the 16th through 21 51 of May 1990. As a result of 
that meeting, the "Caracas Agreement" was signed on May 21 51 and contained the general 
55 The meetings of the Central American Presidents trying to bring peace have never stopped, despite the 
United States pressure for the military solution to the conflict. For more information on the US position 
toward a military solution for the Salvadoran conflict see Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S Tulchin,. Latin 
America Nations in World Politics. (Boulder Colorado: Westview, 1996). 
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agenda and schedule for a new process of negotiations. Also, in that document the 
objectives of the "Geneva Declaration" were reaffirmed. For almost a year, from May 
1990 to April 1991, a series of negotiations followed without reaching any important 
treaties. In April 1991, the government ofEl Salvador agreed to negotiate the Agenda of 
Three Points proposed by the FMLN in an "endless meeting".S6 The three points to be 
discussed were: the amendments to the Constitution, the armed forces, and the cease-fire. 
Under these premises, the meeting began in Mexico City on April 4, 1991 and finished on 
the 27th of the same month, with the "Mexico Agreements," which contained several 
fundamental reforms to the constitution of the country. These reforms were related to 
human rights, the electoral system, judicial system and armed forces. In addition, a Truth 
Commission was to be established.57 
The commission presented the constitutional amendments agreed to in Mexico to 
the National Assembly before April 30 of the same year. In this way the government 
fulfilled its commitment to promote the amendments before this political body. The 
National Assembly approved them, adding other complementary dispositions to 
harmonize with the rest of the Constitution. The newly elected National Assembly took 
up its duties on May 1, 1991, and on September 11, 1991, ratified the amendments 
concerning the electoral system. On October 31, they ratified amendments regarding the 
judicial system. The ratification of the amendments concerning the armed forces were 
still pending until 1992. 
56 Both parties agreed to stay in the process of negotiation and not retire until an agreement was reached. 
57 The Truth Commission was established to investigate the most notorious Human Rights Violations that 
occurred in EI Salvador during the civil war. 
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On July 27, 1991, the Security Council of the United Nations approved a United 
Nations Mission of Observers be set up in EI Salvador (ONUSAL). This authorization of 
observers fulfilled the resolution adopted on May 20. The main purpose of this 
organization was the monitoring and observation of the human rights in the country. 
On September 25, 1991, the New York Agreement between the representatives of 
the government and the FMLN was signed. This document contained important 
decisions, among them, the creation ofthe National Commission for the Consolidation of 
Peace, which was a permanent committee for peace in EI Salvador (COPAZ). This 
commission supervised the fulfillment of all political agreements by both sides and gave 
the final push to the process. 
On December 31, 1991, the Government of EI Salvador and FMLN signed the 
New York Act, in which both sides agreed that the final peace negotiations were to be 
.held on January 16, 1992, in Mexico City, D.F. and that a cease-fire would start on 
February 1, 1992. On January 16, 1992 at Chapultepec in Mexico, the peace agreements 
were finally signed, in which the fmal accords brought the armed conflict in EI Salvador 
to an end. 
In short, the pace agreements were approached through four main topics: 1) the 
role of the armed forces; 2) the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions; 3) 
the economic and social matters; and, 4) the end of the FMLN military structure and legal 
reentry of its members into civil, political, and institutional life. 
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A. ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES 
B. 
• According to the amendments of the new constitution, the Salvadoran armed 
forces would provide security to protect the national sovereignty and the 
integrity of the national territory. A new Ministry of Public Security was 
created besides the Ministry of Defense. This ministry was to be the Ministry 
of Public Security that would take control over the new civilian Police force 
that was going to be created. 58 
• A doctrine was implemented to accomplish the new role of the EI Salvador 
armed forces (ESAF) according to the amendments of the constitution. Also, 
a board of academic studies was implemented at the military schools to 
supervise the education and training of the new generations of officers. The 
board was going to be composed of three well-known civilians and three 
military members. The board was widely accepted by the military and the 
civilians and they were to supervise the modification of the curriculum for the 
entire military schoo1.59 
• The ESAF reduced the number of the military personnel by 50% from 60,000 
to 30,000 members. The infantry reaction battalions (BIRI) which were 
created to fight against the insurgency were disbanded. All of the. police 
organizations, including the national police, as well as the treasury police and . 
national guard were disbanded.60 . . 
• All agencies in charge of collecting, processing or disseminating strategic 
intelligence were moved under the control of the Executive Branch. 
CREATION AND STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 
• Creation ofthe National Academy of Public Security to train the new National 
civilian Police (PNC). 
• Implementation of the National Board of Judicature independently of the state 
organs and political parties.61 
• Creation of the National Council for the Defense of Human Rights. 
58 The Constitution ofEl Salvador, 1983. Chapter VII, Article 159. 
59 The military school is the only way to become an officer in the Salvadoran Armed Forces. All the 
services, Army, Navy and Air Force, send their cadets there for two years of common basic education. 
Later, these two years are complemented by another two years in their respective school services. 
60 The National Guard's functions were much the same as the Rural Police. 
61 El Salvador has three independent branches: Judicial, Executive and Legislative. 
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• Amendments to the electoral system including the institution of the Supreme 
Electoral Court to ensure the clean realization of the electoral process. 
• The strengthening of judicial power, which was inefficient and corrupted by 
amendments made to the Judicial system. 
C. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS 
ill In this category the agrarian problem is of special relevance. Those aspects 
are related to the access, acquisition and legalization of occupied land, access 
to loans and technical assistance for small producers, and the definition of the 
beneficiaries. 
• The creation of the general council for the defense of the consumer. 
• Participation of workers in the ownership of future private enterprises. 
• Strengthening of compensatory programs of the government. 
• Implementation of a forum of economic and social cooperation with the 
government as well as managerial participation with laborers. 
One of the most important aspects of this stage was the national reconstruction 
proposal made by the government of EI Salvador after much consultation with the 
different sectors of national life. This included the ex-guerrilla members. This plan 
comprised a special program to facilitate the reentry of the ex-fighters and demobilized 
troops into society, as well as to give attention to the residents of the areas most affected 
by the armed conflict. 
D. THE END OF THE FMLN MILITARY STRUCTURE AND THE LEGAL 
REENTRY OF ITS MEMBERS INTO THE CIVIL, POLITICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY 
This section includes: 
• The mechanisms for the concentration, identification and disarmament of 
former guerrillas. 
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• The legislative measures necessary to guarantee the ex -guerrilla members their 
legitimate reentry to civil life with a complete legal framework. 
• The releases of all captives for political reasons as well as constitutional 
guarantees and security for those in exile or wounded. 
• Finally, the legalization of the FMLN as a political party. 
The most important achievement of the Peace Agreements was the recognition of 
the need for social, political and military changes that had to be carried out in EI Salvador 
in order to move the country out of the civil war. Without hesitation, the role of the 
armed forces was the most complicated to fulfill among the topics related to the peace 
accords. The next chapter will address how the military reacted under this additional 
burden after the civil war, and also the final application and analysis of Alfred Stepan's 
preroga.tives after the peace agreements. 
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IV. EI SALVADOR'S MILITARY PREROGATIVES AFTER THE 
PEACE AGREEMENTS 
The preceding chapters have described recent Salvadoran history in civil-military 
relations and the nature of the peace agreements. This chapter will apply to El Salvador 
the "selected prerogatives of the military as an institution," posited by Alfred Stepan in 
his book, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. 62 Also, this 
chapter will analyze the means by which the Salvadoran aimed forces achieved a position 
of advantage over their civilian counterparts before and after the peace agreements, and 
how the government subsequently decided to take action in order to make changes in this 
imbalance Stepan's prerogatives will be applied to the Salvadoran case stUdy before and 
after the Peace Agreements. 
When the Peace Agreements are analyzed, it is important to keep in mind what 
Bonnie Tenneriello, GeofThale and Richard Millet state: that ''the emphasis in the peace 
accords was on creating democratic structures, not on deep socioeconomic refonns.,,63 
The failure or success in creating democratic political institutions will lead to the failure 
or success in restoring civilian control over the military, and in moving EI Salvador 
toward the consolidation of democracy. 
The selected prerogatives used by Alfred Stepan are: 
• Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the political 
system; 
62 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1988). 
63 Richard L. Millet, and Michael Gold-Biss, Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in 
Transition. (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1996), 185. 
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• Military relationship to the chief executive; 
• Coordination of defense sector; 
• Active-duty military participation in the Cabinet; 
• Role of legislature; 
• Role of the senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees; 
• Role in intelligence; 
• Role in police; 
• Role in military promotions; 
• Role in states enterprises; and 
• Role in the legal system. 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE PREROGATIVES 
In the following section, Stepan's eleven prerogatives will be applied to the 
Salvadoran case. 
1. The Constitutionally Sanctioned Independent Role of the Military in 
the Political System 
Alfred Stepan's first prerogative has been abused extensively in the countries of 
Latin America. The military, using the respective country's legislature, frequently 
intervened in politics. The Constitution was the source and justification of the military 
intervention in politics. By law, the military was the moderator that often intervened to 
defend the constitution against any action which was a result of political infighting 
between political parties or factions. Therefore, in analyzing a case of military 
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intervention, it is important to consider the specific mission or missions of the military 
according to that country's constitution. 
According to Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State, "the military 
science is an area in which specialized competence acquired by professional training and 
experience is necessary for decision and action.,,64 With the professionalization of the 
Salvadoran military, which started in the 19th century, they realized that the influence of 
the military is in theory circumscribed to a very specific field and limited to the political 
arena. Therefore, involving the military in the political field is inappropriate. The action 
of "knocking on the garrison doors,,65 by civilians in Latin America, has been widely used 
by many oligarchies in Central America. The civilians often appealed to the constitution 
that the military was sworn to defend. Consequently, when something was going wrong 
in the country, ranging from economic deterioration to political repression, the civilians 
looked for military approval and support to remove the government and install a new one 
with different policies. 
In EI Salvador, the military participated in politics under the umbrella of the 
country's basic law, the constitution. There was a provision that the military was the 
"Guarantor of the Democracy.,,66 Consequently, military participation in the political 
field was common until 1992, when through the peace agreements, amendments to the 
64 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 1957), 71. 
65 This action of knocking on doors of garrisons is to ask the military to carry out, or to help a specific 
sector of society in executing a coup d'etat. 
66 See the 1963 Salvadoran Constitution, Chapter VIII, Article 211. 
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constitution were made and the military no longer had a legitimate political role in the 
country.67 
2. Military Relationship with the Chief Executive 
Very good relationships between the military and the chief executives was the rule 
until 1979, after which date it became a problem. Since 1963, in the Salvadoran 
Constitution, Article 157 states that the chief executive is the commander-in-chief of the 
military and exercises the privileges inherent therein. This exercise of authority by the 
executive over the military had not been a problem mainly due to the long tradition of 
military presidents from 1932 to 1979. However, problems of control over the military 
arose in 1982, when Dr. Alvaro Magana became the first civilian president, followed by 
Jose Napoleon Duarte (1984-1989), Alfredo Cristiani (1989-1995) and Armando 
Calderon Sol (1995-1999). All of them were elected in free elections certified by United 
Nations observers. 
The military felt that receiving orders directly from civilians was not right because 
the civilians did not know or understand the military way of thinking. Therefore, despite 
the fact that according to the national Constitution the president was the Commander-in-
Chief of the Salvadoran military, the top military officer, or the Minister of Defense, was 
actually in charge ofthe military. 
67 With the amendment of the constitution in article 211, the missions of the military were relegated strictly 
to the defense of the sovereignty and the integrity of the Salvadoran national territory. Salvadoran 
Constitution and amendments, 1992. Constitucion Politica de El Salvador, Capitulo VIII, articulo 211. 
Fundaci6n para Estudios de la Aplicaci6n del Derecho, San Salvador, El Salvador, cuarta edici6n, 1997. 
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Problems over the control of the military during El Salvador's civil war were 
always present. There were two reasons why the civilian-elected government did not 
exercise more control over the military: First, the coup d'etat against General Romero in 
1979 (which ended the authoritarian regime and started the movement toward installing a 
democracy in the country) was led by the military. The civilians joined the coup later to 
form the ''Juntas.'' Therefore, the military perceived themselves as the leaders of the 
democratic movement rather than the followers, and were reluctant to give up this 
position. Second, the executive was excluded from civilian advice due to the absence of a 
civilian elite knowledgeable in military issues and capable of exercising effective oversight. 
In this regard, it is important to realize that many civilians were not part of· the 
government due to the fear of becoming a political target. Consequently, the military 
institution was prepared to carry out many different' tasks. Those tasks were not only 
related to the planning and execution of the war, but also included many social and civic 
programs.68 The lack of civilian .advisors to the president was critica~ and allowed the 
military to retain many prerogatives without opposition. 
It is also important to mention that the military played an important role not just in 
the government. The military was the only sign of government or state authority in many 
isolated places in the countryside due to the lack of governmental offices. This resulted in 
close military ties with the civilian population. 
With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and the beginning of the end of the Cold 
War, the civil war in El Salvador reached a new phase. The conclusion of the conflict 
68 Civil-military programs were handled by the military in all fourteen provinces, until the program was 
canceled in 1992. 
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With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and the beginning of the end of the Cold 
War, the civil war in El Salvador reached a new phase. The conclusion of the conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union also facilitated the transition of 
democracy in El Salvador, pushing the government and the FMLN to try to reach an 
agreement to end the civil war. 
The Salvadoran transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime 
started with the 1982 elections.69 Since those elections, the prominent role of the military 
has declined and a normalization of civil-military relations has developed. Many 
civilians in this new phase are willing to participate in the peaceful process of 
strengthening democracy, making the president's job as the commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces easier. 70 The president of El Salvador is now leading the country from a 
more powerful position due to the presence of an effective civilian Cabinet and the 
assistance and advice of civilians knowledgeable about defense security-related issues. 
However, there are still some prerogatives that have to be moved away from the military. 
These will be explained later in this chapter. 
3. Coordination of Defense Factor 
During El Salvador's long legacy of military presidents between 1932 to 1979, 
another negative element was inherited. The top military position was not the chief of 
staff, but the Defense Minister. A senior military officer, rather than a civilian appointee, 
69 The fIrst free and democratic election was held in 1982 to elect the constituent National Assembly. Since 
then, three civilian presidents representing opposition parties have bestowed the presidential sash to one 
another peacefully. 
70 Many are former students of the High Strategic Studies Course. 
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nonnally held this position. The job of supervising the military was viewed as a very 
dangerous task and one that created very powerful adversaries and did not boost one's 
political career. Therefore, few civilians in civil service wanted to be involved in 
defense-related issues. Instead, they handed that responsibility to military personnel. 
Twenty years later, the problem is more difficult than just selecting a civilian for Minister 
of Defense. There are few qualified appointees for staff positions. 
The first step in the right direction was taken when a retired general was 
appointed as a civilian Minister of Defense in 1997. Retired General Jaime Guzman 
Morales, a fonner Minister of Defense, became the first civilian named to that office. 
This was a bold move made by the Calderon Sol government. It facilitates civilian 
oversight of the military because the actual Minister of Defense is considered part of the 
institution. It also prepares the institution for a full transition toward a civilian appointee 
in the future. 71 
However, it is important to avoid a situation in which the Ministry of Defense 
becomes a "little more than a clearing house for personnel management, logistical 
support, and basic services such as health care for military personnel.,,72 Instead, the 
ministry should be the liaison between the military institution and the civilian 
government, responsible for the policies to run that institution. Therefore, the real task of 
the new civilian Minister of Defense is to maintain his full duties and not to give up his 
real missions which are being both the president's advisor on national security issues, and 
71 In E1 Salvador, there are now civilians interested in defense-related issues. Some are preparing 
themselves through different studies in and out of the country. 
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the link between the president and the military.73 This will be something important to 
follow very closely. 
4. Active Duty Military Participation in the Cabinet 
Participation of Salvadoran active duty senior officers in government Cabinets 
was a common occurrence prior to the peace agreements. Besides the Minister of 
Defense, other positions normally taken by the military were the Ministers of mterior, 
Public Health, and Agriculture. It was not until the signing of the Peace Agreements that 
a full transition of civilians into the cabinet and key public offices was accomplished. It 
is important to mention that the participation of the military in the National Security 
Council (NSC) is also limited. 74 The NSC is comprised of the President, the Vice-
President, and the ministers of Presidency, Interior, Defense and two top national security 
advisors. The role of the NSC will be important in replacing the hegemony of the 
military over defense policies. With the implementation of the Salvadoran NSC, the 
president has civilian advisors in national defense and national security policy making 
which were posts traditionally only given to the military. In October 1998, there were no 
active-duty officer participating in the Salvadoran cabinet. Instead, an emerging new 
generation of civilian servants has replaced that previous military hegemony, and is 
providing necessary civilian advice to the president. This is an important step in civilian 
control of the military. 
72 Larry Diamond and Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore and London: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1996),58. 
73 Salvadoran Anned Forces Organic Law, Chapter II, Article 31. Executive decree Number 152, San 
Salvador, El Salvador, 1997. 
74 The National Security Council of El Salvador was created in September 2, 1992 by executive decree 
No.65 during the Alfredo Cristiani government. 
46 
5. Role of the Legislature 
The Salvadoran legislature has no tradition of being involved in defense matters. 
During the civil war, the main source of acquisition and development of military 
equipment was through military aid from the United States rather than from the budget 
passed by the National Assembly. The military aid was controlled directly by the 
military without any civilian supervision. Table 5 shows the level of direct US assistance 
to El Salvador. 
While US military assistance was increasing during the 1980's, the military 
budget as a percentage of the national budget did not increase and remained constanfs. 
However, with the end of the war, US military aid was severely reduced. Only a small 
budget for the IMET program is currently available.76 Thus, the military ,is now 
dependent on the budget approved by the National Assembly.77 
75 Salvadoran Budget, 1980-1990.,Direcci6n General de Estadistica y Censos. Gobiemo de El Salvador. 
San Salvador, El Salvador, 1990. 
76 The IMET or International Military Education and Training Program is currently under less than half a 
million dollars and is used only for education or training of military or civilians working in the armed 
forces ofEl Salvador. 
77 Even though the military's social security fund (IPSFA) is one of the most powerful economic and social 
institutions with approximately $100 million dollars. This money belongs to the affiliates individually, 
according to the contributions or shares they own. 
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Year IMET* LOANS FINANCING TOTAL 
1980 0.2 5.7 ---- 5.9 
1981 0.5 10.0 25.0 35.5 
1982 2.0 16.5 63.5 82.0 
1983 1.3 46.5 33.5 81.3 
1984 1.3 18.5 176.8 196.6 
1985 1.5 10.5 124.8 136.3 
1986 1.4 ---- 120.4 121.8 
1987 1.5 ---- 110.4 111.5 
1988 1.5 ---- 80.8 81.5 
1989 1.4 ---- 79.9 81.3 
1990 1.4 ---- 79.6 81.0 
. . 
*IMET: InternatIOnal MIlItary EducatIOn and Trammg . 
Table 5. Direct US Assistance to EI Salvador, 1980-1990 (in US $ millions) 
Sources: Agency for International Development, "US Overseas Loans, Grants and 
Assistance from International Organizations, 1980-1990"; Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, "EI Salvador Under Cristiani: US Foreign Assistance 
Decisions" (Washington, D.C. July 1993). 
Another important problem to overcome is that the military very seldom, if ever, 
provided the legislature with· information about military expenditures, plans or the 
execution of military operations. The military considered this classified national security 
information. Therefore, only a few people knew exactly what the military was doing, and 
what resources were available to them. 
After the Peace Agreement, many changes occurred in the legislature. New 
rounds of elections for congress were held, facilitating the participation of many political 
groups, including the FMLN. This made possible the involvement of representatives of 
new political coalitions in the National Assembly. Also, the number of seats was 
increased from 64 to 80 in order to allow the participation of small political parties.78 
78The Salvadoran electoral system allows minority parties to participate in the National Assembly if they 
receive the majority of the residual votes after the fmal computation. 
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This pluralistic political involvement was important to ensure the reorganization of all the 
committees in the National Assembly, including the Defense and Appropriations 
committee. The participation of many political parties in the National Assembly's 
Committees allowed them to playa role in approving or disapproving the military budget. 
Therefore, the military was required to lobby in order to gain resources. This work of the 
military with the congress included periodic working sessions with the various 
committees in order to explain the military's needs. In addition, the military used various 
activities to educate the Legislative committee in order to obtain approval of the military 
budget. 
This change in the National Assembly reflected the changes in the appropriations 
of the military budget. The national budget has increased from approximately $771 
million in 1992 to $1.9 billion in 1998. However, the military budget of $99 million has 
not increased during the same time period of seven years. This lack of growth in the 
budget represents a reduction of $57 million in real terms, due to annual inflation. 79 The 
1998 military budget is worth only $42 million in constant 1992 dollars.so The reduction 
in the military budget suggests that the prerogatives of the Salvadoran military related 
with the role of the legislature have been decreasing steadily and moving toward 
complete oversight by the civilian government. 
79 According to the National Central Bank the inflation rate in El Salvador is approximately 10 to 12 
percent per year. 
80 Situaci6n del Presupuesto de la Defensa Nacional. Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional, San Salvador, El 
Salvador, 1998. 
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6. Role of the Senior Career Civil Servants or Civilian Political 
Appointees 
Anyone who seeks to play a role in assisting the executive branch in designing 
and implementing defense and national security policies must know that national defense 
involves observing, preventing or neutralizing the possible or potential security threats to 
the state, and analyzing them as accurately as possible. To do so, it is necessary to 
analyze the country's and neighboring countries' capabilities. Generally speaking, 
national defense includes "all the resources and activities that a state adopts in peacetime 
and during war in order to face a conflict."sl These include political, diplomatic, 
economic, social and military resources. As the definit,ion states, military resources are 
just one of the many aspects considered for the planning and execution of measures that 
have to be taken to ensure the nation's survival. 
In EI Salvador, as in many countries of the region, the military has traditionally 
been the only player interested in performing this task of looking out for the nation's 
defense. It was not until recently that civilians discovered the importance of their role in 
national defense and that they were the leaders in this political game. 
In order to fill the gap of few civilians with knowledge about defense and 
security, in 1993, under the presidency of Alfredo Cristi ani , a preparation course was 
created for civilians and military personnel who wanted to learn more about those 
aspects. The Course ofHig~ Strategic Studies was designed to prepare senior civil 
81 Translation by the author. The Salvadoran National Defense concept is taught at the Command and 
General Staff College using the National Defense Book, published by Escuela de Comando y Estado 
Mayor 1994. 
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servants, from the public or private sector to analyze and interpret the political, economic, 
social and military aspects of the Salvadoran society in order to assist and advise the 
government in the national security and development of the country and to strengthen the 
civil-military relations.82 
The success of the course was modest, but it sparked the interest of democratic 
institutions, organizations and political parties. Therefore, the government decided to 
modernize and expand the course, and three years later, by executive decree No. 110, 
dated November 8, 1996, a college was created to take over the responsibilities of the 
course. The College of High Strategic Studies, includes an Advisory Group, an 
Administrative Department, and an Academic Department. Since its creation in 1993, 
191 students in six different classes have completed the course.83 Table 6 provides 
information on the student body in this College. 
No. SPONSOR TOTAL 
1 Public and Private 29 
Universities 
2 Private Enterprise 18 
3 Government 45 
4 Armed Forces 47 
5 NGOs* 32 
6 Political Parties 5 
7 Independent Students 5 
TOTAL 191 
*NGO's: Non Governmental Organizations. 
Table 6. Students Graduated in EI Salvador's High Strategic Studies Course, 
1993-1997. 
Source: School of Strategic Studies. San Salvador, EI Salvador, 1998. 
82 This defmition is the author's translation of the course of national strategic studies mission taken from 
the creation of the High Strategic Studies, decree number 110, issued in San Salvador, on November 8, 
1996. 
83 The seventh course was fmished in August 1998. There were 20 civilians and 8 senior military officers 
attending classes. 
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To summarize, civilians must exercise oversight over the military, but achieving 
military subordination to civilian authority is difficult due to the absence of a civilian 
elite knowledgeable about defense matters. In EI Salvador, just recently with the creation 
of the High Strategic Studies, some civilians started receiving education in national 
defense and military-related matters. It will take some time before these graduates 
acquire some experience and start filling the vacancies in governmental and ministerial 
positions. The outlook for the mid- and long-run are good for achieving necessary 
supervision over the military. 
7. Role in Intelligence 
During the civil war, the civilian government lacked a strategic intelligence 
organization. The only strategic intelligence organization was controlled by the military. 
This military intelligence apparatus, known as National Defense Directorate 
(Departamento Nacional de· In teligen cia , DNI) was under the Minister of Defense's 
control. The DNI's mission was to gather, analyze and divulge information for the 
strategic level. However, due to the lack of resources and bad coordination with the 
operational and tactical intelligence information sections, which were under the C-ll 
(Intelligence of the General Staff), the DNI was also collecting and processing data for 
the operational and the tactical level. This was a duplication of effort, but no one did 
anything to correct the problem during the war. 84 
84 It is the author's belief that thi~ duplication of effort was done with the intention of double checking the 
intelligence reports, since one agency was under the Chief of Staff and the other under the Office of the 
Minister of Defense. 
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Under the Peace Agreement, the civilian government took control of the 
intelligence organizations and created a new State Intelligence Agency (Organismo de 
Inteligencia del Estado, OlE). By June 15, 1992, the dissolution of the DNI was carried 
out. The OlE conducted an evaluation of the personnel working at the former DNI, and 
offered employment to those interested. The majority of the personnel who passed the 
selection process accepted the offer and started working for the OlE. 
However, not all the files collected by the DNI during the war were handed over 
to the new intelligence agency. As Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter noted, "The 
military refusal to turn over these files raised doubts about its sincerity in removing itself 
from the intelligence functions.,,85 The final consideration in this aspect is that the only 
school for intelligence training is under military control and all personnel, civilians and 
military who are interested in intelligence must attend this school. 86 
In this process of achieving control over the military, the Salvadoran military 
completed the transition of giving up the control over the strategic intelligence agencies. 
However, it retained the capability to perform strategic intelligence gathering without 
civilian supervision. Therefore, the civilian control over this issue has not been 
completed yet. 
85 Philip J. Williams and Walter Knut, Militarization and Demilitarization in EI Salvador's Transition to 
Democracy, (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 162. 
86 The National School of Intelligence (Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia, ESNACIN) is currently under the 
C-II of the general staff of the Salvadoran anned forces. The school offers basic and advanced intelligence 
courses at level II and level III for civilians and international students. 
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8. Role of Police 
The peace agreement called for the separation of the police from the army and the 
creation of a new civilian police academy (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica, 
ANSP). Before the civil war, the national police was under the Ministry of Defense and 
Public Security. The chief of police was the Vice-Minister of Defense and Public 
Security. Also, active-duty army officers were in charge of numerous departments inside 
the national police structure and in the police academy as well. Therefore, national police 
reform was taken very seriously during the negotiations. The FMLN wanted to protect 
and guarantee the safety of the guerrilla members who were to be demobilized, and to 
improve human rights for the civilian popUlation. 
A deadlock was broken when the FMLN agreed not to share power in the army by 
incorporating former combatants in the armyranks. Consequently, having a professional 
and apolitical civilian police was important for the future ofEI Salvador. Abandoning the 
demands of getting integrated in the army, the FMLN pushed for direct participation in 
the new National Civilian Police (PNC). The pact agreed to by the military and the 
FMLN was that the structure of the PNC was to be composed of members of the FMLN 
(20 percent), former National Police (20 percent) and civilians (60 percent). This was the 
original composition of the new force. s7 However, the army was not ready to give up its 
position without a fight. In 1992, the army demanded that members of the Treasury 
Police and National Guard, both in control of the military, be included in the PNC. 
87 Since. 1994, when the deployment of the PNC started, there have been many changes to the original 
composition of the police. Many police have retired voluntarily, while others have been removed for 
different public demonstrations of misconduct in their police duties. 
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ONUSAL intervened and prevented a violation of the accords by not allowing the 
military to do this, but it created tension and distrust between both parties. 
Despite all the problems, on June 25, 1992, the Legislative Assembly established 
the new civilian police force and its training academy. By 1994, with the deployment of 
5,940 officers across the country, the transition from the old National Police to the PNC 
was completed.88 The military police organizations, treasury police, and the national 
guards were dissolved, although some members were incorporated in Military Police 
units. The most significant change in bringing the police into an autonomous condition 
was carried out when the budget for the PNC was increased. Since 1995 the PNC has 
received a higher budget than the military.89 
For many observers the transition is far from complete. There is a precarious 
balance between the role of the military and the role of the police. Due to growing 
violence in the country, the government has resolved to use the military in the country's 
rural areas in order to help the police maintain order.90 Since 1993, and under presidential 
orders, the Minister of Defense deploys approximately 1,500 soldiers to help the police 
conduct operations in the rural areas. The units are organized in small patrols of ten men, 
two police officers and eight soldiers, to help provide security and logistical support. To 
monitor the actions and movements of the task force organization, a joint operations 
88 During the transition period between 1992-1994, the national police operated under the presidency and 
were supervised by the police division of ONUSAL. 
89 In 1995, the Public Security budget increased 180 percent and since then has been growing steadily. 
Public Security now has the third highest budget, just below Education and Health. 
90 According to the Constitution, article 212, the executive in case of national emergency may call the 
military to help the police perform police duties. This executive decision must be approved by the 
legislative branch of the government. 
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center was established in the different counties with the representation of police and 
military personnel. Final authority was given to the police and, army soldiers were given 
a supporting role. This army role has been widely criticized by civilians and army 
officers who perceived this action as a step backwards, preventing the police from taking 
full responsibility for internal security. 
9. Role in Military Promotions 
The military in many countries has exercised control over the education and 
promotion of the officer corps, thus preventing the civilian government from controlling 
their institution. In EI Salvador the problems of getting control over military promotions 
were in two different areas. The first was the selection of the appointees for Chief of the 
Services, and the second was the promotion of the officer corps. The problem with the 
designation of the chief for the different services, army, navy, air force and the chief of 
. staff was that the executive did not directly designate the appointees by name, but 
selected a name from a list provided to him by the Board of Rank and Promotions.91 
This process requires that a Board of Rank Promotion presents the candidates to 
the executive and he chooses from the ones presented to him. If the president does not 
select any candidate from the list presented to him, a new list is presented until he selects 
a candidate. The reasoning for this process, according to the military, is to avoid the 
appointments of candidates lacking the necessary credentials for that office, based on 
military regulations.92 For military rank promotion, the same process is followed. The 
91 The Board of Rank and Promotion is composed only of military personnel designated by the Minister of 
Defense and the Chief of Staff. 
92 Interview by the author with a senior officer in the Salvadoran Armed Forces. 
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Board of Promotion selects the candidate and the chief executive approves or disapproves 
the candidates. The president may only choose from a list certified by the Promotion 
Board and may not choose the candidates for promotion directly.93 
This process is problematic because the Board may only consider candidates from 
a specific class for promotion. As a result, there is not much incentive for an officer to 
excel in work, since there is no fast track for the better-qualified candidates to receive a 
command post. Also, when a promotion is given as a class, the loyalty to the group is 
stronger than the loyalty to the institution. Therefore, having a mixture of officers in 
every promotion facilitates civilian control because the cohesiveness of a group is broken 
and it is replaced by loyalty to the proper civilian authorities. 
10. Role in State Enterprises 
The role of the military in state enterprises was an important consideration for 
governments prior to the coup d'etat of 1979. During those administrations, many key 
public institutions that the military saw as essential to ensure the state's survival were in 
their control. Such was the case in the national water works (Administraci6n Nacional de 
. 
Acuaductos y Alcantarillados, ANDA), the state industrial development corporation 
(Instituto Salvadoreno de Fomento Industrial, INSAFI), the national administration of 
telecommunications (Administraci6n Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, ANTEL), sea and 
ports executive commission (Comision Ejecutiva Portuaria Autonoma, CEP A), the 
hydroelectric executive commission (Comision Ejecutiva del Rio Lempa, CEL), the 
93 In order to select the candidates for promotion, the Board follows the law for military promotions which 
has been modified since the peace agreements, signed by the chief executive, and ratified by the Assembly. 
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ground transportation commission (Direcci6n General de Transporte Terrestre) , the 
census and statistics commission (Direcci6n General de Estadistica y. Censos), customs 
(Direcci6n General de Aduanas Terrestres) , civil aeronautics (Direcci6n General de 
Aeronautica), the postal service (Direcci6n General de Correos) and the Salvadoran 
Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto Salvadorefio de Transformaci6n Agraria, 1ST A). 
Since the military coup of 1979, some progress was made in reducing military 
control over the state enterprises. During the three civil-military juntas, civilians replaced 
military officers in the bulk of the Cabinet positions, including the Minister of Interior, 
Agriculture and many of the public services offices. As Williams Philip and Knut Walter 
noted, "during the Magana (1982-1984) and Duarte (1984-1989) governments, there was 
a more concerted effort to appoint civilians to replace military officers in important 
public positions, but the results were mixed."94 Throughout the years, the positions in all 
key public institutions listed above were handed over to civilian appointees. 
Almost the same path of replacements was followed in order to reduce the 
participation of active duty-officers in the Cabinet. Civilians during and after civilian 
presidential periods gradually replaced the military. This transition was consolidated 
with the Peace Agreement when civilians were designated to fill all Cabinet positions and 
key public offices. 
94 Philip J. Williams and Walter Knut, Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador, (Pennsylvania: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997). 
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11. Role in the Legal System 
The judicial branch is headed by the Supreme Court of Justice. The number of 
magistrates is not stipulated in the Constitution, but is determined by ,statutes. 
Magistrates were appointed by the Legislative Assembly with simple majority votes to 
five-year terms.95 This specific situation led to the basic problems with the legal system 
in EI Salvador. 
The legal system was one of the most inefficient organizations in EI Salvador, 
because it was highly politicized. For many years, the Magistrate positions in the 
Salvadoran judicial branch were political appointees, and were not necessarily prepared 
to work efficiently inside the system. A law degree was not required in order to be 
nominated as a magistrate. This flawed system allowed political, economic, sqcial or 
military groups to avoid punishment when abuses were perpetrated by anyone who knew 
the right people in the right place .. 
Many crimes against society were perpetrated by the military, especially during 
the civil war, and no one did anything to stop them. Heavy influence over political 
appointees allowed the perpetrators to escape with impunity and without the fear of being 
captured and judged by the law. There has never been a Salvadoran military person 
judged for a human rights violation. Even though by the terms of the Peace Agreements, 
an Ad Hoc Commission was established to conduct an evaluation and make 
recommendations to the Salvadoran president and to the UN secretary general about the 
95 Until the 1992 congressional elections, the party that controlled the executive branch, nonnally also 
controlled the legislature with a simple majority. 
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human rights abuses during the civil war, a general amnesty was approved by the 
National Assembly.96 
Although all the officers involved in the Report of the Ad Hoc Commission were 
removed from the military, including the minister and vice-minister of defense, the 
amnesty was attacked by the political opposition as a violation of the Peace Agreements. 
However, as Tricia Juhn notes, "its enactment nonetheless allowed democratic gains to be 
made in other ways. ,,97 
However, since the mid-1980's, many changes in the Salvadoran legal system 
have taken place. Now, the magistrates must be appointed by two thirds of the National 
Assembly rather than a simple majority. The applications are scrutinized and the profiles 
of the candidates analyzed very carefully by a committee, which recommends their 
approval. Therefore, this process avoids political appointees or people with unethical 
behavior, and allows the system to work properly. 
12.' Analysis of the Findings 
The findings are divided into three categories of prerogatives: low, moderate and 
high. This classification of three different categories follows Stepan's application of the 
prerogatives. 
A low prerogative is de jure and de facto effective control exercised by 
civilians over the military. A moderate prerogative exists in cases were 
the military has de jure been denied a prerogative, but the new democratic 
government, due to active or passive noncompliance by the military, does 
not effectively exercise this prerogative. A high prerogative is defined as 
96 The commission's report called for the removal of 102 officers, including the minister and vice-minister 
of defense, most generals, and many of the colonels. 
97 Richard L. Millet, and Michael Gold-Biss, Beyond Praetorianism. The Latin America in Transition. 
(Miami: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 1995),214. 
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the military retaining and exerclSlng a high degree of autonomy and 
control over the government.98 
The findings of the different prerogatives are related to the categories in Table 6, 
Chapter II that were already established before the Peace Agreement of 1992, and applied 
in Table 7 until 1997. 
After the applications of Alfred Stepan's eleven prerogatives, it is evident that 
concrete progress has been achieved in placing the military under civilian control in El 
Salvador. However, there are some areas that need some'improvements. Chapter V will 
present conclusions and recommendations that need to be followed in order to 
consolidated the process of democratizing this country. 
98 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 97. 
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Prerogative Low Moderate High 
1. Constitutionally sanctioned 1. None. Chapter II art. 159 
independent role of the military of the new Salvadoran 
in the political system Constitution mandates that 
National Defense and Public 
Security must belong to two 
different ministries 
2. Military relationship to the 2. Chapter II article 157 of 
Chief Executive the new Salvadoran 
Constitution establishes the 
President as the Commander 
in Chief of the ESAF. There 
has been no case in which the 
President has fired a general. 
3. Coordination of Defense 3. Recently retired general 
Sector became Minister of Defense. 
Few civilians in staff 
positions in that Ministry 
4. Active Duty Military 4. Absence of active duty 
participation in the Cabinet military participation in the 
cabinet 
5. Role of Legislature 5. Most major policy issues 
related to the Defense or 
Military budget must be 
approved by the National 
Assembly special Committee. 
Few senior civilian officials 
with defense knowledge. 
6. Role of Senior Career 6. There are still few senior 
Servants or Civilian political civilian politicians with 
appointees knowledge about National 
Security and Defense 
7. Role of the Intelligence 7. The Strategic Intelligence 
Organization was given up to 
the Executive Office. 
However, the military retain 
some strategic intelligence 
capabilities under their 
control 
8. Role of the Police 8. New Civilian Police were 
created and placed under 
civilian contro\. A new 
Public Security Ministry was 
created. The military helps 
the Police in internal security 
of the country in rural areas. 
9. Role of Military Promotions 9. The executive and 
legislative branches have no 
control over military 
promotions 
10. Role in State Enterprises 10. Key public or private 
enterprises are controlled by 
civilians. 
11. Role in the Legal System 11. Have almost no legal 
jurisdiction outside the 
military 
.. Table 7. Selected Prerogatives of the Salvadoran MIlItary as an InstItutIOn ID a DemocratIc 
Regime after the Peace Agreements in 1992. 
Source: Based on Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Table 7 indicates the improvements elected civilian authorities have been made in 
achieving control over the military. Out of the eleven prerogatives, nine have been 
reduced since the peace agreements. Out of the nine prerogatives that displayed 
improvement, three of them moved from high to low, taking a big step toward civilian 
control over the military. These were: 
•. Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the political 
system 
• Active duty military participation in the cabinet 
• Key public or private enterprises are controlled by civilians. 
Six prerogatives presented a modest change from the high to the moderate 
category. These were: 
• Coordination of defense sector 
• Role of legislature 
• Role of senior career servants or civilian political appointees 
• Role in intelligence 
• Role in the police 
• Role in the legal system. 
Finally, OIie prerogative related to the relations with the chief executive remains 
in the moderate category, mostly due to the passive presidential compliance for avoiding 
a direct confrontation with the military and trying to keep the status quo with the military. 
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Finally, one prerogative stayed in the high category. This prerogative is related to 
military promotions, despite modifications in military law which refers to military ranks 
and promotion. The military retains a high prerogative in selecting who and when senior 
colonels are promoted to the rank of general. 
From the analysis above, it can be argued that the Salvadoran civilian government 
has achieved a significant level of control over the military in the last seven years .. 
However, it is the author's opinion that despite extensive application of Alfred 
Stepan's prerogatives in many other countries, such as in South America or in Europe, 
this model needs some refining. Stepan does not weigh the significance of the 
prerogatives. In many cases, some prerogatives are more important than others in order 
to show that civilian control over the military has been attained. In the Salvadoran case, 
five prerogatives are most important in order to achieve civilian control. These 
prerogatives are: 
• Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the political 
system 
• Active duty military participation in the cabinet 
• Role of the legislature 
• Role in the police 
• Role in the legal system 
Two of them, the constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military and 
active-duty military participation in the cabinet, are already under civilian control. With 
respect to the role of the legislature, it is a matter of time until more civilians get involved 
in national defense and security policies, and consequently, get full control over this 
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prerogative. Second, the role in the police varies. As long as the military carries out 
police activities, even though it is not their job, this prerogative will stay in the moderate 
category, because the military is not looking forward to handing over control. Finally, 
there is the role of the legal system. Will this be a task in which the Salvadoran judicial 
system has to test its endurance? Since the peace agreements, there have been many 
cases in which military personnel have been involved in civilian crimes, and in every 
case, those involved have been tried under the civilian legal system.99 The only 
remaining question will be, in the case of a violation of human rights, will the military be . 
willing to cooperate in the same way as in the previous cases? Only time will answer that 
question. 
With respect to the prerogative retained by the Salvadoran military regarding 
military promotions, according to Alfred Stepan's definition, the prerogative is high in 
the Salvadoran military because it controls military promotions in terms of who gets 
appointed and when. Although it is a fact that it is necessary to have the president's 
approval and the ratification by the National Assembly in order to be promoted, only the 
ones on the list provided by the Board of Promotion will be considered. 
In order to assess the level of civilian control ofthe military, one must realize that 
the civilian government is able to name the Minister of Defense, control the military 
budget, keep the military independent and out of politics, and refuse all cabinet positions 
to active-duty military personnel. In addition, the president is the commander in chief of 
99 There have been many military officers punished for civilian crimes. In the case of a conviction by a 
jury, the officer is dishonorably discharged and sent to a civilian prison to fulfill hislher term. 
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the ,military. The fact that the military retains the prerogative for selecting the future 
leaders of the Salvadoran armed forces does not substantially change the control and 
oversight over the military by the civilian authorities. Furthermore, the senior military 
are going to refrain from getting involved with politicians in order to get a chance at a 
promotion. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are some prerogatives that have to be taken away from the Salvadoran 
military in order to achieve civilian control over that military, and therefore, complete the 
Salvadoran transition to a democratic regime. First, the civilian Minister of Defense 
should increase control over the military, keep the actual jurisdiction over the policies 
related to military conduct, and act as a presidential advisor for national security. This is 
key to ensuring the control over the military by the civilian authorities. 
Second, the Peace Accords did not provide specific guidance over how the 
legislature should enhance oversight over the military. There needs to be greater 
. coordination within the defense sector. Doing so will make it easier to clearly define the 
defense policy that must be established with the advice of civilian experts. However, 
there are still few civilians with experience and knowledge about defense or national 
security and few staff-level civilians capable of or interested in filling those positions. 
The same situation applies to staff level positions at the National Assembly. 
Those positions need to be filled by people with experience or knowledge in national 
defense or national security. This problem in the short-term cannot be solved. It will 
take some time before there are more people informed about national defense and 
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national security issues. The School of High Strategic Studies (CAEE) is working toward 
that goal, but it will take time before the number of graduates increase. 
Also, the National Assembly needs to control the military budget and acquisition 
of new technology and weapons. A working plan should be developed jointly by the 
National Assembly and the Ministry of Defense. 100 Periodic meetings should be held 
among cabinet officials, Congressmen and their staff, and senior military members 
working together to solve defense issues. 
Third, the military continues to have great control and autonomy over 
intelligence-related aspects. Though it is very sensitive, the strategic intelligence must be 
in the hands of civilian experts whose training must be done in their own schools. 
Fourth, the military must stop doing police work. This interference prevents the 
police from taking full control and responsibility for their' duties. . Furthermore, the 
military is no{ well prepared to deal with police procedures. On the one hand, soldiers 
are spending too much time performing police activities for which they are not trained. 
On the other, soldiers do not receive proper military instruction and training because of 
the time they spend helping the police. 
Finally, officer corps promotions must be reformed. Military law must be 
reviewed, including the promotion system in the armed forces. This is probably the most 
difficult change to make. Many officers try to avoid civilian interference in this area, 
until now considered as an area of exclusive military jurisdiction. It is believed by the 
military that if the law for military promotion is changed, only officers with political 
100 Until 1997, the working plan between the minister of defense and the National Assembly was prepared 
by the military, with little input from the National Assembly's committees. 
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contacts will be promoted. This would presumably create conflict due to the national 
constitution statement that the military should be apolitical. 
EI Salvador is a country where changes are still occurring. Therefore, let the 
Salvadorans find their own way to solve their problems. They have already shown the 
world what a country with a determination can do by maintaining the delicate balance 
between peace and war where the social economic problems which created the war 
remain unsolved. 
The only light at the end of the tunnel is the hope, that with the consolidation of 
the democratic process and the complete subordination of the Salvadoran armed forces to 
the civilian elected officials, multi national corporations start investing in this country, 
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